Critical Notice: Bas van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective by Monton, Bradley
 1 
Critical Notice: Bas van Fraassen,  
Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective 
Oxford University Press, 2008, xiv + 408 pages 
 
by Bradley Monton 
June 24, 2009  
 
 
It probably goes without saying that the advent of a new book by Bas van 
Fraassen is a major event in the world of philosophy of science. Indeed, Scientific 
Representation does not disappoint. It’s full of interesting and erudite discussions, and 
presents controversial arguments that philosophers of science will want to come to grips 
with.  
There are two ways one could review a book like this. One could just go through 
the book, step by step, and highlight the key discussions and arguments. Or, one could 
look at the book through the lens of van Fraassen’s previous work in philosophy of 
science, and focus on the things van Fraassen says that directly relate to his previous 
work. I’ll take the latter approach. Van Fraassen is famous for promulgating a version of 
scientific anti-realism known as constructive empiricism: the doctrine that science aims to 
give us theories which are empirically adequate, and that acceptance of a theory involves 
as belief only that it is empirically adequate (van Fraassen 1980, 12). That was van 
Fraassen’s characterization in The Scientific Image of how an aspiring empiricist like him 
should understand science. While van Fraassen is still a constructive empiricist, he has 
more to say about how an empiricist should understand science, and he does so in parts of 
Scientific Representation.   
Before I focus my review on issues related to empiricism in science, a brief 
overview of the whole book is in order. The book is divided into four parts. In Part I, 
“Representation”, van Fraassen gives a high-level discussion of the nature of 
representation. He points out that representation can happen with physical or 
mathematical artifacts, and that distortion can sometimes be crucial to accurate 
representation. He also argues that there is an essential indexical element to 
representation.  
Part II, “Windows, Engines, and Measurement”, focuses on measuring. Van 
Fraassen argues that “measuring, just as well as theorizing, is representing. … measuring 
locates the target in a theoretically constructed logical space” (p. 2). Van Fraassen looks 
at measurement two ways. First, he does so from within the historical process, when 
measurement procedures are still being established. A crucial point is that “there is no 
independent epistemic access to the parameters to be measured – no access independent 
of measurement, that is” (p. 138). Second, he looks at measurement from a standpoint 
where measurement procedures have already been established, and provides a general 
theory of measurement, in part motivated by the work van Fraassen has done on 
measurement in quantum mechanics.  
I’ll talk about Parts III and IV in more detail below, but briefly: in Part III, van 
Fraassen argues for an empiricist version of structuralism in science. In Part IV, van 
Fraassen argues that a theory need not provide a full account of how measurement 
outcomes link to reality.  
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Scientific Representation is a somewhat long book – over 400 pages total, with 
the main body of the text a little over 300 pages. But if one is just interested in the parts 
of the book that are especially relevant to constructive empiricism and related issues, one 
can just read about 100 pages. Parts I and II can be skipped (with the exception of about 
15 pages, as I’ll discuss below). Parts III and IV comprise about 120 pages, but the first 
half of Part III is a historical discussion of structuralist views in late 19th century/early 
20th century physics. While I found it fascinating, the less patient reader can skip it. Thus, 
after looking at the Introduction (pages 1-3), a reader would not be remiss in starting at 
the discussion of Putnam’s Paradox on page 229 and reading to the end (page 308). The 
appendix to the last chapter, provocatively titled “Retreat(?) from The Scientific Image”, 
is also worth reading (on pages 317-319). (It takes up van Fraassen’s changing views 
about probability, and about what it is for a probabilistic theory to be empirically 
adequate.)  
But between the Introduction and Putnam’s Paradox, there is one fascinating 
discussion that directly addresses a key counterintuitive claim of constructive empiricism, 
the claim that science does not aim to give us truths about what is seen through an optical 
microscope. This discussion takes place from pages 96 to 110. Here, van Fraassen argues 
that the optical microscope should not be thought of as a window on the invisible world, 
but instead as “an engine creating new optical phenomena” (p. 109). Specifically, he 
thinks that the images produced by an optical microscope should be thought of as a 
“public hallucination”, akin to a rainbow. Saying that one sees a rainbow, for van 
Fraassen, is like saying that (while looking through an optical microscope) one sees a 
paramecium. He writes: “As long as ordinary discourse is not filtered through some 
theory it does not imply that [the rainbow and paramecium] are objects” (p. 110).  
Interestingly, even though van Frasssen pushes hard for the view that what one 
potentially sees through an optical microscope falls on the “unobservable” side of the 
observable/unobservable distinction, he ends on a concessive note. He writes: 
I draw the [observable/unobservable] line this side of things only appearing in 
optical microscope images, but won’t really mind very much if you take this 
option only, for example, for the electron microscope. After all, optical 
microscopes don’t reveal all that much of the cosmos, no matter how veridical or 
accurate their images are. The empiricist point is not lost if the line is drawn in a 
somewhat different way from the way I draw it. The point would be lost only if no 
such line drawing was to be considered relevant to our understanding of science. 
(p. 110, emphasis in original) 
It would be worth thinking about how the arguments for constructive empiricism from 
The Scientific Image would change were one to draw the observable/unobservable line in 
such a way that things viewed through the optical microscope count as observable 
objects. Van Fraassen does not discuss this issue, beyond the paragraph I just quoted.  
 Moving on to Part III, we find an argument for an empiricist version of 
structuralism in science. Van Fraassen starts by reviewing the history of structuralism, 
and arguing that past structuralist views failed because they didn’t adequately take into 
account the crucial indexical role in scientific representation. He holds that “structuralism 
finds its proper articulation only in an empiricist setting” (p. 237). Empiricist 
structuralism “is not a view of what nature is like but of what science is” (p. 239). 
Structuralists often say that “all we know is structure” and van Fraassen takes that on 
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board with a caveat: “all we know through science is structure” (p. 238). What science 
does is represent the empirical phenomenon as embeddable in certain mathematical 
models, and these mathematical models are describable only up to structural 
isomorphism. The empirical phenomena are represented by a data model, and a 
successful theory will have the data model appropriately link to a theoretical model. But 
there’s more to our understanding of a scientific theory than that. A crucial indexical 
aspect is needed, to provide the appropriate link between the data models and reality (p. 
257). Van Fraassen holds that we can know that the indexical propositions which provide 
the link are true, and yet the propositions cannot be part of a scientific theory (p. 261).   
 Let’s move on to the final chapter of the book, which, to my mind, is the most 
provocative. Van Fraassen calls it “Rejecting the Appearance from Reality Criterion”, but 
as I’ll explain, he could have called it “Against Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics”, or 
“Why the Measurement Problem is an Artifact of Bad Philosophy”. But before getting to 
the Criterion, I have to lay out some terminology.  
“Appearances”, for van Fraassen, are the contents of measurement outcomes. He 
distinguishes them from “phenomena”, which are observable entities of any sort (p. 283). 
In a interesting footnote, he writes: “I have only slowly come to see the importance of 
marking such a distinction. In The Scientific Image I did not make this distinction either 
carefully or clearly” (p. 391, n. 24).  
Now, the Appearance from Reality Criterion holds that appearances must clearly 
derive from what is really going on (p. 282). As van Fraassen explains, this derivation 
sometimes happens in science. For example, Copernicus derived the appearance of 
retrograde motion from (what his theory said was) the real motions of planets around the 
sun. But van Fraassen does not think that the Appearance from Reality Criterion is a 
completeness criterion for science: a theory can be just fine even if it doesn’t explain how 
the appearances are derived from reality (p. 295). 
Van Fraassen recognizes that it’s “quite generally accepted at least amongst 
philosophers” that the Appearance from Reality Criterion is a completeness criterion for 
science (p. 280). His argument against these philosophers appeals to the norms of 
science, as exemplified by the actual practices of physicists. The basic argument is that in 
the context of quantum mechanics, physicists are generally perfectly happy with simply 
using the Born rule to make predictions for measurement outcomes (where, roughly, the 
Born rule is the rule that gives probabilities for the possible outcomes on the basis of the 
quantum state of the system). But nothing in the theory of quantum mechanics as 
typically used by physicists tells one how the particular appearance we actually get links 
to reality. As van Fraassen writes, at the very end of the last chapter of Scientific 
Representation: 
Advocates of the Appearance from Reality Criterion will not be satisfied with 
quantum mechanics. … Conversely, irenic acceptance of the theory – such as that 
which we have seen prevalent in the physics community, throughout the last 
century – would seem to signal an attitude content without any sustained attempt 
to satisfy that Criterion. This, it seems to me, should allow us to draw the right 
moral about what are and what are not norms that govern scientific practice. (p. 
308) 
Now, it would be open for a philosopher to argue in response to van Fraassen that 
physicists are simply wrong or confused if they reject the Appearance from Reality 
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Criterion, or if they don’t understand why a solution to the measurement problem is 
needed to for quantum mechanics to be a complete theory. But for a philosopher to give 
that response doesn’t fit with the deference to science that philosophers nowadays 
typically show. (It also doesn’t fit with one of the motivating themes of van Fraassen’s 
work, which is to admire science as a paradigm of rational inquiry.)  
I wish there were another appendix to the last chapter, called “Retreat(?) from 
Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View”. Van Fraassen is putting forth a position on 
quantum mechanics that does not come up in his 1991 Quantum Mechanics book, but it’s 
not obvious to me whether the new position is meant to be complementary to the 1991 
position. My sense is that the views are in tension, because in the 1991 book van Fraassen 
puts on the table a particular solution to the measurement problem, known as the 
Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation. (Moreover, van Fraassen played a 
prominent role in the whole development of modal interpretations.) The CVMI solves the 
measurement problem by postulating that systems sometimes have ‘value states’ in 
addition to the quantum state, and the probability that a system has a particular value state 
at the end of a measurement is given by the standard Born Rule (and moreover, what it is 
to be a measurement is given a purely physical characterization). This sort of solution 
makes sense if one endorses the Appearance from Reality Criterion: the reality is that the 
system has a certain value state at the end of measurement, and that accounts for why the 
appearance – the measurement result – is what it is. If van Fraassen is rejecting the 
Appearance from Reality Criterion, and is hence saying that there is no measurement 
problem, then there’s no need to postulate an interpretation like the CVMI.  
 But perhaps van Fraassen’s 1991 view of quantum mechanics really is compatible 
with his new position. In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen does not say that we 
should never postulate links between appearances and reality; he just says that we should 
reject the Appearance from Reality Criterion as a completeness criterion for science. In 
other words, it’s permissible to seek to link appearances with reality, but we shouldn’t 
fault a scientific theory if it doesn’t provide the link. But what then would be the point of 
postulating an interpretation of quantum mechanics that provides the link if the link is 
unnecessary? Perhaps the answer is that postulating interpretations gives us a better 
understanding of the theory. The idea is that each interpretation provides an answer to the 
question “how could the world possibly be the way this theory says it is?” (van Fraassen 
1991, 4) Thus, it’s worthwhile to seek many solutions to the measurement problem, 
because each “solution” helps us to better understand the ways in which the theory could 
be true. (And indeed, personal communication with van Fraassen confirms that he does 
still think that these interpretations aid our understanding of the theory.)  
 But the last paragraph of Scientific Representation provides a potential challenge 
to that view. We would think that physicists would want to understand quantum 
mechanics, but physicists for the most part irenically accept the theory – they do not 
concern themselves with trying to solve the measurement problem. So perhaps scientific 
understanding goes just fine without solutions to the measurement problem, and it’s only 
deep-seated sympathies toward the Appearance from Reality Criterion that leads some to 
think otherwise.  
 I explained above that the last chapter poses a provocative challenge to those 
philosophers of science who endorse the Appearance from Reality Criterion. We now see 
that the last chapter poses a provocative challenge to those philosophers of quantum 
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mechanics who think that there is a measurement problem that needs to be solved. If 
there is no need to explain how measurement outcomes link to reality, then what is the 
point of finding solutions to the measurement problem? Perhaps the answer is just that 
the solutions help give us a better understanding of the theory, but it’s not clear whether 
that answer fits with actual scientific practice. Moreover, even if that is the answer, it 
becomes a serious open question as to whether all work on the measurement problem 
makes sense when seen in that guise. It’s one of the virtues of Scientific Representation 
that it puts these important questions on the table – van Fraassen is continuing his 
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